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DAVID V. SNYDER: Bonjour. Good morning. I would like to
start us thinking about the problems and prospects of comparative
law.
At this point in the conference, at the end, it seems to me we
should focus on two topics. First, we need to identify and consider
the most challenging problems in comparative law. To articulate the
issues often leads a long way toward a solution. Second, we should
look to the future of the discipline, perhaps (but not necessarily) in
light of those problems.
Over the years, and particularly in the last decade, comparative
law has been criticized for excessive doctrinalism, shuttered attitudes
to interdisciplinary inquiry, timidity in approaching broad-gauge
study, as well as tendencies to superficiality, triviality, obscurantism,
and exoticization—not to mention claims of ultimate irrelevance.
These sorts of problems have paralyzed me sometimes. It will not
come as a surprise to you that I have written a certain amount in
comparative law.7 But it may come as a surprise to you that I have
never taught and have no plans to teach comparative law. I do not
know how to do it.
I should perhaps say I have taught no course that has “comparative
law” in the title. I do teach international sales, and in that course I
cannot help but be a comparatist. From the standpoint of
transactional lawyers, there are many legal choices to be made in
engineering a transaction and in choosing the legal regime that will
govern it. To be more concrete: an international sale will require
some source of law. The sale might be governed by international
law,8 or it might be governed, if the parties choose, by some
domestic law. The parties often have the power to choose. The
7. Recent forays include David V. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estoppel, in
MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND SCOTLAND
281 (Vernon Valentine Palmer & Elspeth Christie Reid eds., 2009); David V.
Snyder, Contract Regulation, With and Without the State: Ruminations on Rules
and Their Sources. A Comment on Jürgen Basedow, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 723
(2008).
8. For example, a sale between two businesses will often, by default, be
governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 89-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3. See, e.g., id.
art. 1 (applying to contracts between parties whose places of business are in
different states).
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lawyer, then, must consider the different rules that might be chosen
to apply to the transaction. Those are real choices and thus
comparison with a pointed purpose. In my course, then, we cannot
help but be comparatists in order to be good lawyers. We might
choose international law. We might choose our own law. Or we
might choose the law of the other party. We might make yet another
choice. In any case, we have to compare.
That realistic exercise is a very different kind of discipline from
the more theoretical inquiries that tend to dominate comparative
legal scholarship. I have to admit that when I write about
comparative law, I am sometimes awakened by nightmares about
what I’ve done. And a nightmarish fear has certainly made me think
about the problem. Perhaps if I could name it, the problem would
disintegrate like other nocturnal phantoms.
The fundamental problem for me is incommensurability. Outside
of the context of a particular transaction or case, comparison is
difficult for me, at least if I am to move beyond simple observations.
Measurement appears to be somewhere between explosive and
impossible; insight is largely inarticulate, if not entirely
incommunicable. Having thought about the problem, and not having
come to a satisfying conclusion, I thought I would seek help. This
attempt at help now brings us the constellation currently assembled.
I have gathered some of the comparatists I most admire and have
asked them to tell me whether they worry too. Perhaps my concern is
idiosyncratic. But if they worry too, then how might we feel better? I
know this hope is wishful, perhaps even childlike, but I hope that
spending daylight on dark worries will crystallize the real concerns,
dispel the nightmares, and reveal the most promising paths forward.
There is a sunnier aspect for our panel as well. The end of the
congress is for moving forward. Comparatists probably know almost
as well as historians that looking back is necessary. And we know
almost as well as philosophers that rigor in thought and expression is
required. Yet, this necessary work is all in aid of looking forward.
So I have gathered here a panel of luminaries in comparative law.
Let us attend to them.
GEORGE BERMANN: Obviously each member of this panel has
his or her own personal perspective on what the prevailing
challenges are in comparative law. That perspective will become
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clear in what we say, whether explicitly or implicitly.
Although we have been invited to focus on problems or challenges
or difficulties, I want to say at the outset that the discipline has made
considerable progress. I am quite familiar with the critiques that have
been made of late of the comparative law discipline. I’ve contributed
to the critiques, but I’ve doubtless also contributed to the
circumstances that have given rise to those critiques. But I think in
all modesty that this congress has itself illustrated at least in some
measure some of the ways in which those critiques have been
addressed. We have a long way to go, but I am not approaching you
here in pessimism or in an apologetic mode.
Still, like everyone else on this panel, I do have some concerns,
even preoccupations. My principal concern, which has been a
durable one, relates to the relationship between comparative law and
its sister disciplines of international law, public and private.
Comparative law has maintained a stable and steady relationship
with those fields over the years, a relationship I would characterize
as symbiotic for reasons I have not the time to develop here. I sense
that the changes taking place in the world today are putting great
pressure on the relationship between comparative law and
international law. So let me try to sketch what I mean and, in so
doing, distinguish between public and private international law,
however unfashionable that distinction is today.
In the opening panel in this room on Monday, considerable
attention was given to the contribution that comparative law has
made to the development of public international law. Judge Simma,
in particular, but not only he, spoke of comparative law as a
fundamental source of both customary international law and general
principles of law.
It can be said without exaggerating that comparative law has
contributed importantly, alongside other sources, to the creation of
public international law. Conversely, I believe that public
international law has contributed importantly to comparative law’s
sense of mission. Helping develop public international law is by no
means comparative law’s only mission, far from it. But it is among
them. In sum, I discern in the relationship between comparative and
international law a healthy symbiosis whose continuation we have no
reason to doubt.
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Elsewhere, I do see a problem, or at least the risk of a problem. It
has to do, as you may have guessed, with the changing relationship
between comparative law and private international law. That
relationship is actually really a much more complicated, intimate and
even intense one than prevails between comparative law and public
international law and therefore, by definition, a potentially more
problematic one.
Let me focus first on the core of private international law to which
Judge Simma alluded yesterday, by which I mean such questions as
jurisdiction, extraterritoriality, choice of law, and recognition of
foreign judgments. It is commonplace knowledge that neither
lawyers nor judges can perform the tasks of private international law
without utilizing comparative law. That alone furnishes the basis for
an intensely symbiotic relationship as healthy as the one comparative
law has with public international law. But, I believe there are certain
changes afoot that present a growing challenge for comparative law
in its relationship to private international law.
The change that I would like to highlight for you is the manifest
increase in transnational relations and operations. In other words,
comparative law is increasingly put to the service of the practice of
private international law. The question that arises—only slightly
though, there is no need to exaggerate—is whether the requirements
of private international law imply for comparative law not only an
obvious and reassuring utility but also a potential danger. In my
experience, the practice of private international law involves a
significant reduction in the complexity, the richness, and the nuance
of the law, and foreign law in particular, which is reduced to a series
of legal propositions sufficiently simplified to feed the machinery of
the practice of law and of private international law.
I believe that the appetite private international law has for
comparative law is only growing. What are the consequences, then,
for foreign law as a subject and for comparative law as a method? In
other words, does the utility of comparative law have a price, and if
so, what is the price? Yet, there is no need to overdramatize the
situation. This is not, certainly not, the death of comparative law. On
the contrary, comparative law is in a sense actually valorized by this
evolution. Comparative law is not being denatured either, because
comparative law continues to carry out, as always, its function to
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inform private international law. The challenge is much more subtle:
Can comparative law, at a time when it is increasingly put at the
service of private international law—a phenomenon to which I
contribute—be pursued for its usefulness while safeguarding and
preserving the character of comparative law, a character that values
precisely the precious richness of the law, the complexity of the law,
and its subtleties and nuances? The challenge for comparative law is
thus, despite its instrumentalization, to continue to make its
intellectual curiosity, as well its genuine appreciation of ideas,
prevail over its undeniable practical utility.
The challenge faced by all disciplines that will last is to find a way
to fulfill their traditional roles and, at the same time, to adapt
themselves to new circumstances. For international law—private as
well as public—the mission is clear in an increasingly globalized
world. But the path of comparative law is less evident in this new
landscape, and I believe it is even a little threatened. So, what to do?
There are three aspects to the role we can play in this regard. Our
role as scholars is the easiest one to identify, as it is unchanged. We
can continue to conduct the kind of research and write the kind of
scholarship that preserves the integrity and authenticity and
complexity of the fabric of law as a subject and that preserves the
calling of comparative law. I am not at all worried about the capacity
and the will of the people in this room to address through the
traditional methods of legal academia the challenge that I have
sought to describe.
Second, as teachers, we must prevent comparative law, both in our
curricula and in our writing, from becoming eclipsed by the greater
immediacy and more manifest utility of international law, whether
public or private. We must bear in mind that it is the kind of
intellectual curiosity that comparative legal inquiry fosters that
should drive what we do in the classroom and in our scholarship.
Third and finally, as jurists who engage with practice, whether as
authors of expert opinions or as arbitrators or as contributors to the
construction of new legal institutions and new legal regimes, we
need to resist the ‘banalisation du droit comparé’ [trivialization of
comparative law] that can, but need not, accompany the relevance
that comparative law today enjoys in the practice of international
law. There I conclude and thank you for your attention.
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PATRICK GLENN: Thank you Mr. Chair. I come to the podium
with a keen sense of disappointment, a disappointment which flows
from the realization that I won’t have the occasion to hear my young
and brilliant colleague Nicholas Kasirer, already doyen honoraire, as
they say, of my law school and already ascended to the Quebec
Court of Appeal. Nicholas is a jurist of great subtlety and great
originality, who is perhaps best known for his notion of the outrelangue, or ‘language beyond,’ a general concept designating the
language which exists as a historical and ongoing source beyond
each of the particular languages we know today.9 For Nicholas, and
for me, the language beyond the English language is French, which
gave so much of its vocabulary, concepts and structures to English,
and especially to legal English. This is why the adjectives in ‘court
martial’ and ‘fee simple’ come after the noun. So I will continue
speaking in that particular derivation from Norman French which we
today call English. But I will return to Nicholas’ notion of the
language beyond each language, the outre-langue, to reflect briefly
on its potential for comparative law.
There is an absolutely splendid barrage (from the French barrage)
of criticism in the program about comparative law. And since it was
expressed partly by David in French, I will return to it in English. If
you’re the author, David, I congratulate you on this splendid
polemic. It is said in the program that comparative law has been
criticized for excessive doctrinalism, a shuttered attitude, timidity in
approaching broad-gauged study, as well as tendencies to
superficiality, triviality, obscurantism and exoticization.
Do I worry about that? I don’t worry about that at all. I think I’m
guilty of most of that myself. I think I’ve even been guilty of being at
the same time trivial and obscure. So one can’t worry about this at a
personal level. What is more encouraging is that I think one can find
similar criticisms made with respect to most other disciplines, both
9. See generally the discussion in Nicholas Kasirer, ‘L’outre-loi’, in ÉTUDIER
ET ENSEIGNER LE DROIT: HIER, AUJOURD'HUI ET DEMAIN—ÉTUDES OFFERTES À
JACQUES VANDERLINDEN [STUDYING AND TEACHING LAW: YESTERDAY, TODAY,
AND TOMORROW—STUDIES OFFERED IN HONOR OF JACQUES VANDERLINDEN] 329
(L. Castonguay & Nicholas Kasirer eds., 2006).
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by people outside them and, most interestingly perhaps, by people
within them. So each discipline today goes through crises of one type
or another. In that, I think comparative law is comparable to many
other intellectual pursuits.
I do have a problem, however, with comparative law as a distinct
discipline. Why do we have a distinct discipline of comparative law?
Most people say comparative law is a discipline that began with the
great World Congress in Paris in 1900. I think that’s probably not
strictly exact, though Professor Blanc-Jouvan may correct me. I think
the Société de législation comparée was begun in the mid-nineteenth
century, in the 1860s. So we’ve probably had a recognizable and
distinct discipline of comparative law for 100 to 200 years. What is
striking about that—to me—is that the discipline of comparative law
emerged at the time of the most radical introspection of lawyers in
the world, at a time of radical state construction, and at a time of
radical nationalism in law and in other fields of thought.
Now how should we think about this paradoxical situation? One
way of thinking about it is optimistic. The optimist says that as the
world closed down, comparative lawyers opened windows of light
and maintained contact with other sources in the world. I like to
think that way myself. But my darker side tells me that it may not
have been entirely a process of illumination. It may also have been
the case that comparative lawyers were complicit in nationalistic
endeavors of the time. You can find support for that notion of
comparative law as nationalism in the great taxonomic project of
comparative lawyers, discussed for well over a century, of essentially
classifying all national legal systems as members of given legal
families. There is clearly a process of solidification or reification of
national legal systems in this taxonomic process—national laws as
autonomous, static, incontrovertible entities. This concept of the task
of comparative law was therefore state-centric and nationalistic. It
was very largely Eurocentric.10
I don’t think this was part of any conspiracy. I don’t think it was
10. For the taxonomic project, and use of the biological metaphor of ‘legal
families,’ contrasted with a more dialogical notion of legal tradition (conceived
simply as normative information), see H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal
Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 421-439 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds.,
2006).
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the result of any deliberate decisional process of comparative
lawyers. I think it was probably part of a much larger impression on
legal thought of the scientific positivism which prevailed at that time.
What is it to compare? Everybody knows what it is to compare. It’s
in the dictionaries and anyone can tell you. To compare is to examine
two things, A and B, and to say how A and B resemble one another
or differ from one another. That’s it. There’s no hint of normative
inquiry in the process. It is pure constatation, as they say in French,
or as we say in Quebec English ‘constatation.’
It may be that’s why few law students choose to take courses in
comparative law. They regard it as an oxymoron. Comparison is a
purely descriptive process. Law is a normative process. How can one
do both at the same time? So I don’t think what the world needs is a
discipline of comparative law dedicated to those nineteenth century
ideas of comparison. We certainly need the data which the social
sciences provide us, and which many comparative lawyers provide
us. But there is a real need for the skills and knowledge of
comparative lawyers in adding a normative dimension to the debate
about comparative law. My view of the future of comparative law
follows from that proposition.
My McGill colleague, Charles Taylor, has written that all
normative debate is comparative, every normative proposition
standing in relation to, and alongside, other normative claims.11 I
think this is the message which comparative law can give to the
world, and I think this is presently happening. It is most visible in the
form of transnational judicial dialogue, a normative dialogue which
is being vigorously pursued today (itself surrounded by normative
debate).12 This requires us to rethink what it is to compare.
If our present understanding of comparison doesn’t allow us to do
11. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 72 (1989) (“Practical reasoning . . . is a reasoning in transitions. It aims
to establish, not that some position is correct absolutely, but rather that some
position is superior to some other. It is concerned, covertly or openly, implicitly or
explicitly, with comparative propositions.”).
12. A recent survey of the debate identified some 3,000 law review
contributions in the United States alone. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts
and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 647 (2008). For a recent,
book-length treatment of the debate, in terms of necessary ‘engagement,’ see VICKI
C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010).
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that, then there are useful suggestions in the history of the word
itself. Where does the English word ‘compare’ come from? It comes
from the outre-langue of English, French, and the French word
comparer. Where does the French ‘comparer’ come from? It comes,
of course, from one of the outre-langues of French, Latin—
specifically the Latin word ‘comparo.’ This is a composite word,
composed of the word com (or cum), in English ‘with,’ and par, in
English ‘peer’ or ‘equal.’ So com-paring can be seen as a process of
existing with an equal, or that which is taken to be an equal, in spite
of evident differences. It is a process of what was once referred to in
Spain as convivencia, the process of living together in a nonconflictual manner in spite of profound differences or beliefs.13
I think it is today the main task of comparative lawyers to develop
multiple means of convivencia, as a way of enabling the world to live
in a non-violent manner. Now the exquisite irony of this is that the
more successful comparative lawyers become in doing so, the less
visible comparative law will be as a discipline. Everyone will be
doing it. There is a clear parallel with Alice in Wonderland’s
Cheshire Cat who would slowly disappear while smiling. The last
thing you saw was the smile. Perhaps the last comparative lawyer in
the world will disappear leaving only a smile [audience laughter].
And the smile of the world’s last comparative lawyer will be the sign
of the ultimate triumph of comparative legal thinking. Thank you
very much.
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: I gather that I am on this panel for two
reasons. First, I am not just an academic law professor but also a
social scientist. And second, I’ve worked extensively on the part of
the world formally known as Eastern Europe.
After 1989, I began studying the political transitions in the former
Soviet world, focusing on how police states turn into rule of law
states through dismantling surveillance, bringing police under law,
increasing procedural guarantees for criminal suspects, increasingly
parliamentary lawmaking, and generally bolstering transparency,
13. The convivencia was that of Muslims, Christians, and Jews during the time
of Islamic reign in Spain. There is, of course, debate on the extent of their peaceful
co-existence. For the methods and logic of com-paring, see generally H. Patrick
Glenn, Com-paring, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 91-105 (Esin Örücü
and David Nelken eds., 2007).
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accountability, and rights enforcement. After 2001, I’ve been
studying the rise and entrenchment of the global anti-terrorism
campaign. In this campaign, states have been ramping up
surveillance, giving the police and intelligence services more leeway,
eliminating procedural guarantees, moving to forms of executive
lawmaking, and generally decreasing transparency, accountability,
and rights enforcement. The very aspects of authoritarian governance
that were dismantled in the post-Soviet transitions all show some
signs of being newly attractive after 9/11 as states take steps to fight
terrorism. It’s like déjà vu all over again, but backwards.
I say this to give you a sense of my frame of reference. The study
of the transitions out of state socialism on one hand and the rise of
the anti-terrorism campaign on the other illuminate some particular
problems in the study of comparative law more generally. In
particular, I want to address three issues: considering the
comparative treatment of ideological subjects, attending to the gap
between law on the books and law in action in comparative
scholarship, and noting the effects of global trends and global
institutions as we look at changes in domestic law.
First, on ideology. Both of my lines of work involve ideological
subjects and there are specific problems that come with this territory.
What are ideological subjects? It’s hard to have a neutral view about
communism, terrorism, and things of this kind. In fact, people who
work on these topics tend to have strong views in favor of neoliberal
law over socialist law or human rights concerns over anti-terrorism
programs—or their inverses. Strong prior beliefs about what is right
in an ideological battle raise some methodological red flags for
comparative law.
For example, for many comparativists who worked across the
socialist law/non-socialist law divide, there was a tendency to
compare ideal systems with real ones. During the Cold War, it was a
commonplace to compare ideal democratic rule of law systems with
actually existing socialist ones or, if the analysts had the reverse
politics, they compared ideal socialism with actually existing
capitalism. Any ideal will look better than any real system, so these
are not fair comparisons. And the comparison is even more unfair
when one assesses a system against an ideal that it does not aspire to
reach. It is easy to caricature the system one doesn’t like by pointing
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out the ways in which it falls short of an ideal, particularly of some
ideal that the system in question does not share.
This practice of flogging legal systems for failing to live up to
others’ ideals carried over into the post-Soviet world, when those
who believed that they “won” the Cold War urged countries once on
the other side to hasten in making their legal systems look as nearly
as possible like those of their former adversaries. The legal systems
that have emerged from these changes often lurched toward their
ideological opposites with predictable results. The lurches failed and
something altogether more complicated took hold. We can only
understand what really happened if we stop looking through these
ideological lenses and recognize the current legal systems in the
former Soviet world as the mixes of historical legacies and
complicated aspirations that they are.
With respect to terrorism, one can also see the dangers of
ideology. Some who work in the field start from the view that the
greater danger to human flourishing in an age of terror comes from
the governments that overreact rather than from the terrorists who
attack. Others start from the view that the fundamental human right
at stake is the right to security, which must be guarded against the
constant danger of terrorist attack. Those who write with security
clearances cluck-cluck at those naives who are not getting the
“ghosts and goblins” reports that detail the imminent threats waiting
in the wings. Those on the outside who focus on the effects of antiterrorism policy call attention to the “collateral damage” to human
rights that such policies have had for Muslim communities as well as
for communities of dissidents everywhere. Here too, the security
hawks often fail to see that the values of the human rights advocates
are not antithetical to security, and the human rights advocates often
fail in turn to recognize that there may be real threats that need to be
addressed. A less ideological look at the law and its effects (as well
as at lawlessness and its aftermath) will reveal that there is much to
be learned from comparative experience that starts from facts on the
ground rather than ideologies in the air. Ideal human rights views
contrasted with the details of an actually existing anti-terror
campaign will overestimate what is possible, while a security-only
view overestimates the disruptive effects of rights.
As a first methodological matter, then, I would counsel that it is
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unwise to compare the ideal with the real, especially across an
ideological divide.
My second methodological point urges that it is also unwise to
compare doctrine in one system with practice in another. Since many
of us often compare systems with which we’re very familiar because
we live in them with systems about which we learn from afar through
reading, it is a constant temptation to compare the details of the
systems one knows from daily practice with the doctrinal rules of
another system one knows about only from reading. The field of
sociolegal studies has been dedicated to demonstrating that law in
action is almost always very different from law on the books. If one
compares the doctrine on one side with the practice on another, one
is comparing very different beasts, a less helpful enterprise than one
imagines.
My role on the panel as a social scientist is to exhort us all to think
about what we are doing when we compare doctrine from one system
with practice from another. In every system, we know that there is a
gap between these two things. And yet somehow it is very hard to
keep that gap in mind when looking at a number of different legal
systems precisely because it is extremely difficult to know the
detailed practice of so many systems without living for long periods
of time in each place. If we see law as a practiced activity, as
something that exists as actual habits and practices of people and not
just as doctrinal categories, we will have a much better grasp of what
comparative law can tell us. Recognizing the gap between law on the
books and law in action is necessary if we are to make headway in
understanding how any legal system works or how one legal system
is different from another.
Moreover, and this brings me to my third point, we need to
understand this relationship between law and practice in a new
international frame. Our field has assumed for a long time that most
similarities across legal systems are achieved horizontally—that
countries borrow legal ideas from other countries, or that they give
and take transplants. Alternatively, similarities have been imagined
genealogically through the metaphor of legal families. But in the last
several decades, we can see the increasing prominence of top-down
international influence, from international organizations straight into
domestic legal systems without the usual horizontal or genealogical
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processes in place. I very much agree with George Bermann that one
of the key challenges for our field is the increasing role and
increasing penetration of international law into domestic law. George
is a specialist in international private law where the dynamic is quite
different than in international public law where I tend to work. In my
areas of research—legal transitions and anti-terrorism law—
international institutions have had an enormous effect on the
landscape of domestic law in parallel ways in multiple countries at
once. Let me give two examples that illustrate both the gaps between
law on the books and law in action as well as the increasing
penetration of domestic law by international law.
In the former Soviet world, international financial institutions had
an important say about how countries in the region accomplished
their transitions. Almost all of the countries of the former Soviet
world came under International Monetary Fund tutelage at some
point in that process. When that occurred, the domestic law of
countries under the IMF-mandated austerity programs could no
longer be understood primarily in terms of the country’s own internal
law-making processes. Agreeing to loans from international financial
institutions required changing domestic law in particular ways, even
when domestic lawmakers had no desire to do so. As a result, we
saw sweeping across the former Soviet world programs that slashed
social safety nets, imposed flatter tax systems, created openings for
global capital to come into the domestic economy, and took back
benefits that had been promised to citizens from the Soviet period.
Much of this was accomplished by law, and the legal effects had to
be documented back to the international financial institutions to
show that they had worked. The requirements of the international
financial institutions not only necessitated legal change, but also
mandated that there be more than the usual degree of correspondence
between law and practice. If we as comparativists only examined
these countries horizontally—comparing Poland with Hungary or
Russia with Ukraine—we would have missed that these common
programs sweeping across such a wide swath of the former Soviet
world were the result of the common mandate of international
institutions. Moreover, we can see in these austerity programs
external demands for results, which made law in action rather closer
than it often is to law on the books.
In the global anti-terrorism campaign, a series of resolutions of the
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UN Security Council, Resolution 1373 and others, have required
states to change their domestic law in specific ways to comply. Here
too, from the fall of 2001, one could see sweeping across the
legislative landscape of a surprising array of countries new laws that
criminalized terrorism offenses, authorized asset freezes of people on
newly constructed watch lists, permitted new forms of intrusive
surveillance, and tightened up on refugee and asylum claims. The
Security Council’s newly formed Counter-Terrorism Committee
insisted on reports from UN member states that first documented the
legal changes and then provided statistics on how many terrorists and
how many dollars were seized through these new mechanisms.
Doctrinal changes worked very much in parallel but domestic
compliance with these new laws varied widely. The extraordinary
similarity of the laws states have passed after 9/11 can only be
understood by reference to the common international pressure that
brought those laws about—but the gaps between laws on the books
and laws in action tell us that doctrinal change doesn’t mean that law
hits the ground in the same way in all places.
In particular, some states seem to have passed anti-terrorism laws
to comply with these Security Council mandates and just stopped
there, while other states have used the draconian new anti-terrorism
laws to rout their domestic opposition or to carry out their own
unique programs of repression rather than to fight global terrorism in
parallel with other states. So, for example, even though Vanuatu
passed an anti-terrorism statute that was nearly bigger than the
country itself, the statute has not been used at all. By contrast,
Thailand adopted an anti-terrorism law on the Security Council
model and that law has been actively deployed. But the antiterrorism law in Thailand has not been used to fight the kind of
global terrorism that the Security Council had in mind. Antigovernment protestors occupying the main square in Bangkok were
forcibly dispersed by the government in spring 2010, and many were
shot and killed. Even though these protestors were not at all
connected to the global war on terror, those protestors who were
arrested were charged under the anti-terrorism laws that the Security
Council required Thailand to adopt. Having similar laws on the
books in Vanuatu and Thailand did not produce similar uses of these
laws in practice. These two examples—which could be endlessly
multiplied—show that global templates emanating from international
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organizations may be adopted by different countries in very similar
ways. But one must look to the practice to understand they are being
used for highly different purposes from place to place. Having
similar laws on the books does not necessarily begin to demonstrate
that these laws are carried out the same way everywhere.
So then, how should we think about comparative law as we meet
at this international congress? The examples I have just given show
that we should no longer think of domestic law as particularly selfcontained. The more that countries become enmeshed in global
institutions, the more they adopt templates that allow them to adapt
to the forces of globalization. And so increasingly, domestic law is
being changed through the effects of international institutions. But
even though international law may be becoming increasingly
important for understanding comparative law, it is only the
comparative lawyer who can see just what this means in practice.
In my remarks today, I have tried to call attention to three
problems – the dangers of working in ideological subjects where
there is a tendency to compare one system’s legal practice with
another system’s legal ideals, the problem with failing to see that law
in action is quite different than law on the books and the necessity of
recognizing that the forces of globalization mean that domestic law is
changing rapidly in response to the top-down pressures of
international institutions. In thinking about these three problems,
however, a single solution suggests itself: more careful, observant
and patient comparative law research.
AMR SHALAKANY:14 Good morning. Bonjour. And sabah elkheir! If we’re going to introduce French heavily on this panel, then
we might as well include my mother tongue, Arabic. But don’t
worry, I won’t impose that on you now. Not yet!
As George mentioned, a lot of our views on where comparative
law stands today and how we can take our discipline ahead happen to
be quite autobiographical—and such is certainly the case in my own
work. More specifically, my biggest challenge for the last couple of
14. Because of the advent of the Arab Spring in Egypt, Professor Shalakany
was not able to participate fully in editing these remarks. The editors have worked
with, and we hope remained faithful to, his text, but he has not been able to check
all editorial changes. His remarks in response to the interventions from the
audience could not be included for similar reasons.
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years has been to grapple with how Islamic law has been
traditionally defined as a field of comparative legal studies, pretty
much since 1932 when the First Hague Congress of Comparative
Law passed a resolution put forward by the Egyptian Delegation, and
adopted ‘à main levée,’ formally reserving “dans le prochain
Congrès, une place à l’étude du droit islamique non seulement
comme source de droit comparé.”15 That to my mind was the
historical moment when my field became a subject of comparative
law, a deeply emotional moment for the Egyptian Delegation which
returned back to Cairo beaming with nationalist pride that Islamic
law has finally made it on an equal footing with civil law and
common law, and a deeply disciplinary moment out of which came
an entire field of study concerned with finding functional analogues
across these three legal traditions, all the way from family law to
banking and finance.
My biggest challenge is the definition put forward since 1932 at
the Hague Congress on what constitutes ‘Islamic law’ for
comparatist purposes. See, if you’re going to study Islamic law, then
what you’re fundamentally studying is Islamic legal history because,
as you all know, Islamic law is not fundamentally thought of today
as a law in action, but rather a law that existed in the past and then
was replaced after the colonial encounter by a variety of civil and
common law transplants from the late nineteenth century onwards. In
that historical understanding of Islamic law as fundamentally a thing
of the past, there is one definition that dominates comparative legal
studies since 1932, which must now come to grapple with very
serious critiques that demand of us a rethink of what constitutes
Islamic law.
To give this a bit of a theoretical framework, I’m going to use the
work of the French philosopher and historian Paul Veyne,
specifically a beautiful short book published back in 1971 called
Comment on écrit l’histoire, or “how we write history,” in which he
introduces something called “[l]a notion d’intrigue.” According to
Veyne, for the historian “les faits n’existent pas isolément, en ce sens
que le tissu de l’histoire est ce que nous appellerons une intrigue, un
15. Translation to English: The Congress passed a resolution by show of hands
formally reserving, in the next Congress, a place for the study of Islamic law not
exclusively as a source of comparative law.
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mélange très humain et très peu « scientifique » de causes
matérielles, de fins et de hasards . . . . Le mot d’intrigue a l’avantage
de rappeler que ce qu’étudie l’historien est aussi humain qu’un
drame ou un roman, Guerre et Paix ou Antoine et Cléopâtre.” In
answering the question, “Quels sont donc les faits qui sont dignes de
susciter l’intérêt de l’historien ?,” Veyne answers “Tout dépend de
l’intrigue choisie; en lui même, un fait n’est ni intéressant, ni le
contraire. . . . car le fait n’est rien sans son intrigue . . . . [E]n
histoire comme au théatre, tout montrer est impossible, non parce
qu’il faudrait trop de pages, mais parce qu’il n’existe pas de fait
historique élémentaire . . . .”16
What does that mean? Basically for Veyne, if one is going to write
history, including legal history, then one by default is engaging in an
‘intrigue’—and the best English translation for ‘intrigue’ I could
think of is a ‘plot,’ both in the amusing literary sense of the term
(such as an interesting plot of action underlying a good play or
novel), but also a ‘plot’ in the more darkly conspiratorial sense.
Islamic legal history, as the core of my comparative legal studies,
can also fall under one of three alternative plots. So what I’ll do for
the remainder of my time is I’ll take you through first, what has been
the dominant plot of Islamic law history since the Hague Congress of
1932; second, how this plot has been challenged by two alternative
plots over the last 20 to 30 years; and then three, why you should
care as comparative lawyers engaged in Islamic law between these
alternative plots.
The first plot, which is the dominant plot, boils down pretty much
to the following—if you’re going to study Islamic law, then the
doctrines that you are studying have to be derived from some
16. PAUL VEYNE, COMMENT ON ECRIT L’HISTOIRE: TEXTE INTEGRAL [HOW WE
WRITE HISTORY : FULL TEXT] 51-53 (1971). Translated to English: “Facts do not
exist individually in the sense that the structure of history is what we will call a
plot; a very human but not so much scientific mix of material causes, ends, and
hazards. The word ‘plot’ has the advantage of calling to mind that what the
historian studies is as human as a drama or a novel such as War and Peace or
Antony and Cleopatra.” In answering the question: “Which facts are worthy of the
historian’s interest?” Veyne answers: “Everything depends on the chosen plot. In
itself, a fact is neither interesting nor uninteresting because the fact is nothing
without its plot. Thus, in history as in theatre, showing everything is impossible,
not because it would require too many pages, but because there is no elementary
historical fact.”

2011]

COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

953

scripturally revealed text. This means, basically, either the Koran or
the Sunna of Prophet Mohammad or Ijmaa (a matter about which
there is scholarly juristic consensus), or alternatively Qiyas, which is
analogical reasoning derived from any of these three sources.
Anything that is outside of these four scriptural sources of Islamic
law does not merit study by a comparative lawyer interested in
Islamic law.
There is a huge problem with that scriptural definition of Islamic
law, namely that it does not include a whole variety of judicial
structures and doctrinal arrangements that have existed since at least
the time of the Byzantines, and which have been later collected under
the doctrine of siyasa shar’iyya, or in French ‘politiques juridiques’
[legal policies]. These doctrines are dismissed from the study of the
comparative lawyer, indeed from the study of the historian of Islamic
law generally, as being either ‘secular’ or from ‘extra-Sharia’
jurisdictions—certainly for the two leading scholars of Islamic law
history, Schacht and Coulson.
This means that in Plot No. 1, which continues to be the plot
dominant until now, you are relying on a particular set of primary
materials which happen to be juristic textbooks of fiqh or Islamic
jurisprudence, textbooks that come in various lengths and forms but
are fundamentally written by jurists, for jurists, and about jurists.
And that story is not of a law in action but rather a law in books. It’s
not about what people are doing in courts, it’s rather how the jurists
theorized the legal system as a whole.
This particular conception of Islamic law came under attack from
the 1970s onwards particularly after the publication of Edward
Said’s book, Orientalism. The concern was that the conception of
Islamic law presented there makes Islamic law exactly the radical
opposite of any form of Western law, whether it’s civil or common.
If the history of Western law has been a history of evolutionary
functionalism—Western law develops over time in order to deal with
changing needs of society or indeed leading these societies to its new
reactions—Islamic law, by contrast, seems to be almost
dysfunctionally resistant to evolution, in the sense that there’s one
right answer, God revealed it, it has to be based in one of the
scriptural sources, and it applies today just as it applied a thousand
years before.
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Against this, a second plot emerged from the 1970s onwards
which has a very clear anti-orientalist streak to it. Without getting
into much detail, this plot is fundamentally a variation on Plot No. 1.;
it relies on the same set of primary materials—again juristic
textbooks without looking at all these other institutions that existed
in practice, but argues that Islamic law has actually developed here
and there by tweaking some of the major historical moments of its
development.
I don’t have much time so I’ll move on to Plot No. 3, which by
contrast has emerged now for the last almost 10 years. It’s very
different from the two other plots because first, by way of primary
materials, it looks at Ottoman court records as opposed to juristic
textbooks. Second, it does not tell the history of Islamic law as a law
of jurists, but rather tells a history of Islamic law by looking at the
history of people coming to court, something that we might call
subaltern history. And third, it gives you a sense of Islamic law as
something much more changing and developing over time than the
other two plots would concede.
This Plot No. 3, which I would call a new historiography of
Islamic law, has so far been marginalized both in defining Islamic
law as a field of legal history, and therefore also as a field of
comparative legal studies. I would argue that if one wants to move
forward in dealing with Islamic law in comparative law, then one
should take Plot No. 3 a bit more seriously. And I hope the stakes in
taking it seriously are evident in the paper that is distributed on your
tables.
If one is interested in comparing the governance of sexual crimes
under Islamic law before the colonial encounter, and if you stick with
Plots No. 1 or 2, then you are also stuck with the hudood table on the
first side of the page, which basically states a number of
punishments, distinctively harsh, from stoning to lashings, but also
reveals a set of background norms of evidence and privacy that
effectively stop them from being applied in practice. You flip the
paper on the other side and you find alternative siyasa punishments
for the same crimes, not lashings or stonings this time, but a series of
fines that vary depending on the social class of the person who is
being accused.
And so at stake in choosing what kind of Islamic law we will deal
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with in comparative law between Plot No. 3 and Plots 1 and 2 is first,
a very clear distinction between lashings and stonings on the one
hand and fines on the other; second, for someone who is interested,
as myself, in a progressive transformation of Islamic law in the
future, if you include siyasa as part of your study of Islamic law, as
opposed to the dominant tradition in scholarship today, then the very
definition of your discipline becomes unclear.
And this is where I am torn. It seems on the one hand that it’s
much better to be fined than it is to be lashed or stoned. On the other
hand, the evidentiary barriers to conviction that exist at the bottom of
the first table and that effectively stop Islamic law from ever being
applied might also take you in an opposite direction. It might be
actually better for you to stick with Plot No. 1 because it might
actually provide more safeguards in keeping the state outside of the
bedroom.
This has been an incredibly short and brief description but I’m
glad to expand it more in questions and answers. Thank you.
ELISABETH ZOLLER: First, I would like to thank Professor
David Snyder for having invited me on this panel and for giving us
such good directions as to what we should talk about this morning.
Each of us was invited, to all feasible extent, to choose a particular
theme among the numerous problems of the discipline comparative
law. My own theme deals with the indeterminacy of the discipline—
what I could also term the uncertain object of comparative law.
What makes me uncomfortable in comparative law is the
indeterminate nature of the discipline. What is its goal? What is its
end? What are we trying to do, to prove, or to achieve when we
compare legal systems?
Where is the need to ask such metaphysical questions, will you
say? My answer is based upon Jean de la Fontaine’s advice, the
French fabulist who recommended in The Fox and the Goat:
“Whatever way you wend, consider well the end.”17
17. JEAN DE LA FONTAINE, Le Renard et le Bouc [The Fox and the Goat], in
OEUVRES COMPLETES: FABLES CONTES ET NOUVELLES [COMPLETE WORKS:
FABLES AND SHORT STORIES] 115 (Jean-Pierre Collinet ed., 1991), translated in
Jean de la Fontaine, The Fox and the Goat, ETURAMA.COM,
http://www.eturama.com/histoires/the-fox-and-the-goat-1068 (last visited Jul. 1,
2011).
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This is wise advice. How many of us have a clear vision of what
we are doing and where we are going? Personally, I must confess
that I have difficulties to give clear and straightforward answers to
such questions.
Of course, the indeterminate nature of the object of comparative
law varies according to each comparatist. There are as many uses
made of comparative law as there are individuals interested in it.
Nonetheless, what is striking is that, in spite of their diversity, all of
these individuals, with a few exceptions, seem to see the discipline
only as useful, and sometimes even under a utilitarian doctrine.
Comparative law is now entirely dominated by an instrumental
approach. President Bermann said it very well before me. It is
perceived as a means to an end, one end only, which is to resolve
concrete practical problems.
Foreign laws are like objects displayed on the shelves of a big
legal Walmart. Everybody walks by with a cart, taking one or several
articles that they need to resolve a particular problem. Foreign laws
are no longer objects of study. They are products, consumer
products, regarded as quick fixes to pressing needs. In the worse
cases, they are considered as convenient means to respond to
embarrassing popular demands and to follow through on hazardous
electoral promises. True, this consumer approach may turn out to be
useful more often than not. But I have difficulty to conceive
comparative law as a toolbox only.
The utilitarian function of comparative law cannot be questioned,
and should be pursued. Yet, comparative law should not be reduced
to that. For a scholar—I mean a scholar educated in the tradition of
classic humanities who was taught that what matters is not to resolve
problems but to formulate them—the utilitarian approach does not
permit us to understand the diversity of legal worlds, and even less to
make sense of them.
We live in a world where everything is globalized, but in which
legal systems remain as diverse as they were in the last century. If
there has in fact been interpenetration of the public law systems,
notably between European states, I do not believe—no, I do not
believe that we can speak of a standardization of public law, even
through international law. Regarding the issues of government
organization, the purposes of the State, the notion of State itself, a
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real abyss exists between the American and European conceptions of
public law.
Regarding the content of public law, it is not true that only judges
guarantee rights and liberties. Jean Carbonnier was right when he left
it up to a civil code and a public prosecutor to guarantee freedom. In
countries of codified law, freedom starts with the legislator. On this
side of the Atlantic, things are seen differently. But why? Isn’t it
something that should be explained? The main task of the
comparative legal scholars does not fundamentally differ from that
which Montesquieu had given himself on the threshold of the The
Spirit of Laws.
“I have, first of all, considered mankind; and the result of my
thoughts has been, that amidst such an infinite diversity of laws and
manners, they were not solely conducted by the caprice of fancy.”18
It is not enough to know how the law works to explain the
diversity of legal systems and make sense of them. In the same
manner that, in 1987, Allan Bloom worried about Closing of the
American Mind, closing of the comparative mind is one of the
greatest dangers we must face.
The turn has come for the comparatists to be “des juristes
inquiets,” that is—concerned lawyers for their discipline, as the
French civilists were for theirs in 1929, according to the adjective
Paul Cuche used to describe critics of the school of exegesis. 19 In
order to stop the appalling depletion of the legal thought that
threatens legal education, we must bring humanities and social
sciences back to law school; we must resist the temptation to make it
a professional school only. Yes, there is room for humanism at law
school, as it is true that their function is not to produce filled minds
but good minds. Thank you.

18. CHARLES-LOUIS DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS xliii (Thomas Nugent trans., G. Bell & Sons 1914).
19. See Marie-Claire Belleau, The “Juristes Inquiets”: Legal Classicism and
Criticism in Early Twentieth-Century France, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 379, 380
(defining “juristes inquiets” as “worried or anxious” French legal academics whose
goal was to overthrow legal classicism and renew French legal thought at the end
of the nineteenth century).
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INTERVENTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE
AUDIENCE20
CHRISTIAN ARMBRUSTER: Thank you very much. I just want
to make a few remarks about the notion of legal families just used by
Patrick Glenn. I think one of the key challenges to comparative law
nowadays is to reassess the concept of legal families because the
good old days—when we easily divided the world into legal
families—are obviously over . . . . I think a reassessment in any case
is necessary. . . . We have heard a lot about the growing influence of
international law on national legal orders. . . . So I have a question
for Professor Glenn: Where does that leave the notion and concept of
legal families?
TALIA EINHORN: I am from Israel. I also wanted to respond to
Patrick Glenn about the Cheshire cat at the end. One of the first
chapters of the Bible tells the story of the Tower of Babel when the
people had one language and one word—the same words. And the
story, of course, is that they wanted to build the Tower of Babel and
God came and confused their languages and dispersed them over the
Earth and that was the end of that story.
Now some say it was a punishment but in fact, another
commentary says it was the saving of humanity because when people
speak the same language and have the same words or ideas,
essentially, it is problematic because a variety of thought is lacking.
So I like much better your idea of convivencia, the same as living
next to each other—existing next to each other because in fact, one
of the greatest things about comparative law is reflecting upon our
own system in a completely different way after we’ve stepped down
and looked at it and really understood what makes the differences.
So, I think this is one of the objects of comparative law. And thank
you very much for a wonderful time.
LOUIS DEL DUCA: I will first thank the panel for a very
stimulating and informative presentation. And as I listened to the
20. Many of the interventions were not entirely audible in the recording and
thus not available for transcription. The editors, with apologies to intervenors, have
done their best to state the sense of each intervention. In addition, not all
intervenors are audibly identified in the recording, so not all can be identified here.
As with the panelists’ presentations, all French is here translated into English by
the editors.

2011]

COMPARATIVE LAW: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

959

presentation, I was impelled to parlay the comments that the panel
made to the development of teaching materials particularly in the
post-World War II period. When George Bermann talked about the
new concern, interest and focus on public international law, I looked
back at the casebooks and materials that we were utilizing in the ’50s
and ’60s and ’70s. And you compare that now with the kinds of
materials and new kinds of subject matters that we’re addressing, I’m
optimistic as I look at that development.
We now have the public law component and the comparative
teaching is evident in new constitutional law comparative books that
didn’t exist until relatively recently on this side of the Atlantic. And
we look at the new kind of development of teaching materials like
the West Publishing Company series of books which are addressed to
the task of providing law teachers who have not had exposure to
comparative law training and experiences with materials that relate
contract laws specifically in a comparative context, injecting CISG
kinds of materials into that field. And it’s comparably in the
constitutional law field, judicial review on a comparative basis. None
of that really existed until relatively recently.
I look at what’s happening in Europe and on this panel for
example. The panel put on a wonderful presentation that we had
from Justice Ginsburg and Miguel Maduro. Here is the European
Union in its own fantastic integration of this great experiment in a
public kind of institutional development that has occurred there—
unique in the history of the world. But they’re not satisfied to just
think of themselves as such; after all, what did Miguel Maduro tell us
yesterday—that they’re in the process of forming a global
governance program in thinking beyond their own limitation. And
this includes talk about the vertical imposition of rules, combined
with transplant processes, moving beyond the historical horizontal
process.
I’m merely trying to suggest that new horizons have been
developed—and very constructively, very creatively. And the fact
that this has occurred leads me to be rather optimistic about what the
developments are, where the use of comparative law not only for
academic purposes, not only for skills training to develop expertise
to handle private counseling. I think what has evolved in the recent
years is a concern, a motivation to utilize comparative law to develop
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new institutions, new structures that can address the problems that
need to be addressed.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I’ll join the chorus here. I take issue
with Professor Bermann’s comment. If I understood it correctly, the
appearance of public international law and private international law
elevates utility over practicality. I think that for comparative law—in
my class I focus on this, I have a practice background—the most
important thing in international practice is understanding where your
clients come from. And for that you need to know comparative law.
That’s the most important thing in practice.
I would say the other really practical value is—one of the panelists
already said this—any law reform is comparative. So I would just
agree with the other side in this fashion, that that’s the core basis.
And I think it’s still perfectly valuable.
OLEKSIY KRESIN: Oleksiy Kresin, Ukraine. I have a comment
and a question for Patrick Glenn. You mentioned something about
the history of comparative law and the start of this history. Two
centuries ago in 1810, Paul Feuerbach mentioned comparative law as
an academic discipline, called comparative legal science. If we take
this as a starting point, maybe Feuerbach’s commentary should be
taken to be a sign of a well-established comparative legal science as,
perhaps, he assembled the first well-established treatise on
comparative law as general subject.
You know it’s an eternal question—what is the starting point of
comparative law? But you know it’s quite curious when you point to
1869 and the creation of the French Society of Comparative
Legislation as a starting point because in the same year, we had in
Ukraine, in Kiev, a treatise on the history of comparative law. So
how could this have started in 1869 when the history of comparative
law was already being written? Thank you.
RALF MICHAELS: Ralf Michaels, Duke University. There is a
certain call on the panel, as I take it, to have more sophistication in
comparative law. However, it seems to me that one problem of
comparative law in action where it is most influential—in the World
Bank, in the Rule of Law Project of the American Bar Association—
is that these projects do not even reach the modest level of
sophistication that we comparative lawyers already have, or put
differently, that there is almost no comparative law in these projects
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at all. So, to take Islamic law as an example—as misguided or
shocking as its understanding by many comparative lawyers may be,
this understanding is still more informed than that of many law
reformers and of people advocating war against Islamic countries.
So my question is: what do we, as comparative lawyers, do with
this situation? Do we, firstly, say we try to dumb down our work so
as to make sure our work remains relevant in these projects? Or,
secondly, do we emphasize the complexity of comparative law in
order to try to keep back such governance projects, by telling them
that things are actually not as easy as they take them to be? Or,
thirdly, do we say we are in fact a non-interventionist discipline, so
we remain on the sidelines and we critique from the outside while we
observe? I am personally quite unsure which of the three options,
each of which sounds quite unattractive, we should actually take. But
that seems to be, to me at least, the biggest task that we have as
comparative lawyers right now—to determine how we engage with
these governance projects of which we are not a part.
ADRIEN WING: I am Adrien Wing from the University of Iowa.
I’d like to congratulate the panel for the wonderful perspectives. I’m
particularly delighted that Professor Shalakany was here who was
able to speak not only in English and French but also could have
done the whole thing in Arabic as well and probably several other
languages. And so I have loved this discussion but I think, for the
future, I have a plea that it would be really great if at the next
international congress we could actually not worry as much, “Have
we closed down?” but “When will we open up so that we will hear
the voices of the majority of the world who are not in this room?”
And so because of the nature of this discipline and how it has
evolved over time, we’re still, in the twenty-first century, literally
only hearing from a small portion of the world—as I was just looking
around this room. And so I think we really need the voices of the
majority of the world, whether we are talking about many more
people from Asia, a mass of people would be from Africa, the
Middle East and so forth. I’m glad to see there are some Latin
American people here. But we need more voices in the dialogue or
else we’re just kind of perpetuating the kind of things that Edward
Said and others with the orientalist kind of discipline said—we’re
just talking to each other and we’re not really getting their
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perspectives. And the majority of the world may have very different
ideas about lots of these issues.
And because of the problems with so much wealth, as represented
in this room, and not enough wealth from the majority of these
countries, I think it would great if somehow we could get the
resources in the next four years to assemble critical masses from a
variety of countries. And I don’t know if that’s by foundations
sponsoring people or by different institutions here at the Society
sponsoring people. So we could update these debates with many of
the voices that are not in the room.
And I’m hoping, as Patrick was saying, that there would be this
Cheshire cat with a grin. And the grin would come about from the
joy that would come from hearing from the majority of the world
scholars and practitioners on these topics. Thank you.
NICOLÁS ETCHEVERRY: I will just follow up your thoughts.
Thank you for this wonderful panel. And I would like to congratulate
you all. A special thanks to Professor Elisabeth Zoller for what she
said about warning us about the risk and danger of finding
comparative law only a consumer product and having only a very
utilitarian view of it. She quoted Montesquieu and the infinite variety
of mankind. And that is if that infinite variety of mankind is not
telling us to become those voices of the world that are not listened to
today, then we are in debt. The infinite variety of mankind forces us
to understand, respect, and love each other, each time more, and each
time better. And if humanism and human sciences do not intersect
with comparative law, then comparative law loses its meaning and its
goal. Thank you very much.
PABLO LERNER: Pablo Lerner, Ramat Gan School of Law,
Israel. And I have a question to Professor Shalakany. As a matter of
fact, I continue the path of Professor Wing. I have read your article
addressing the adoption of foreign ideas in Egypt.
During this congress I was asking different people about their
thoughts on the following idea: I don’t know how it is possible to
seek harmonization and multiculturalism. So this is what led me to
the question. On one hand we study for a world of codification; on
the other hand, there are a lot of people who want multiculturalism,
pluralism, and so on. Furthermore, the problem of harmonization
continues. They do not have a very clear role in this process. They do
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not play the game. And I am not sure of even in the following
congress there will be 300 persons from China, 300 persons from
Europe, 300 scholars from Guatemala. Honestly, I do not know. And
especially that you have to deal with this question. So perhaps you
can help me finish the congress on this matter. Thank you.
SYMEON SYMEONIDES: Thank you, David. I shall be brief. I
don’t think it should matter when comparative law began, but since
several dates were mentioned, let me give you another date. How
about 700 BC? When Solon, the lawmaker in Athens, was asked to
draft the laws of Athens, do you know what he did before that? He
traveled around the known world, at least the Mediterranean villages.
He studied the customs and went back home and drafted laws based
on the wisdom or experience of that excursion. So in a sense,
comparative law, or at least the idea of observation, began then. And
I’m sure there are other examples in history where the laws of other
countries were recognized before, but I don’t know.
Another point on George’s take on the connection between private
international law and comparative law: I think that connection is
becoming increasingly close. I will give you an example. In the old
days, we used to choose the applicable law based on the context of
all states with a relationship. You didn’t need to know what you were
choosing. In fact, you were not supposed to care what you were
choosing until after you had made the choice and then you have the
ordre public exception and so on. So a lot has changed since then. At
least in the United States, and increasingly in other countries in the
world, we care very much what we choose and why we choose it.
And we believe that there cannot be an intelligent choice unless you
know and understand very well the laws which you choose. As a
result, that has made choice of law far more complex but it also
increases its dependence on comparative law. It made choice of law
more uncertain but we believe it made it more rational. So the
relation continues, and it is becoming even more intense. Thank you
very much for an excellent, excellent time and an excellent congress.
Thank you.

RESPONSES FROM THE PANEL
ELISABETH ZOLLER: I would like to react to the interaction
between public international law and comparative law. I’m very

964

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:4

skeptical about ‘narrowing the gap’ between public international law
and comparative law because I do not see how comparative law has
changed public international law. Here, of course, I’m not referring
to private international law, which is something quite different and
must be governed by domestic laws in the absence of international
treaties or conventions.
As far as public international law is concerned, I’m sorry to say I
do not see many changes which would have been triggered by
comparative law in the basic norms of public international law that
apply to the subjects of international law, the law of treaties, or
international responsibility. I don’t think that comparative law has
modified these fundamental principles. International law—public
international law—remains the law of a society of states.
Now where it comes to the interactions that can be made in private
and public international law, I think that in this country, we have a
tendency to view the two as very similar or let’s say to view the two
as forming a continuum. I doubt that in other parts of the world, the
view is the same. I would suggest that federalism as a basic tenet in
the constitutional structure of the country is very important in that
respect. Thank you.
AMR SHALAKANY: [Remarks were largely inaudible and must
unfortunately be omitted.]21
KIM LANE SCHEPPELE: I would like to address the problem of
socialist law. Of course, if you look at comparative law in textbooks
before a certain date, socialist law appears as one of the great legal
families. But it has now apparently disappeared. I want to suggest
that it actually lives on. Ironically, one of the places where socialist
law has been preserved is in the United States. If you look at the
jurisprudence of the Warren Court in the 1950s and 1960s, in
criminal procedure decisions in particular, it was a common practice
for the Supreme Court to cite Soviet sources and to say that if the
Soviet Union does things this way, we will do the opposite. Soviet
law lives on in the constitutional criminal procedure of the Warren
Court—or what remnants of those decisions still remain.
In addition, law from the socialist period still exists as law in the
books in many post-Soviet places. Labor law, which had not been
21. See supra note 14.
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enforced as written in the Soviet period, suddenly came to be
enforced by courts taking law seriously in the 1990s after socialism
was gone. Or social rights were for the first time universally enforced
only after the Soviet Union collapsed. Practice changed, even when
the letter of the law remained largely intact.
The IMF targeted the post-socialist states’ enforcement of social
rights provisions in constitutional law in the early years after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. But the IMF’s insistence on shredding
social safety nets came into conflict with the IMF’s Rule of Law
projects. The constitutional courts of both Russia and Hungary made
extraordinary decisions in the mid-1990s announcing that there was a
constitutional limit to how much social rights programs could be cut
back in the course of these austerity programs. The reactions of the
governments in Russia and Hungary to these constitutional
pronouncements were actually very different, however. In Russia,
President Yeltsin paid no attention to the Constitutional Court. Their
decisions were simply ignored, and the austerity programs were
pushed through as the IMF insisted. In Hungary, however, where the
government really didn’t actually want to cut back social programs to
begin with, the government went back to the IMF after the
Constitutional Court decisions and said, we have a Constitutional
Court that tells us we can’t construct the austerity program the way
you would like us to, and of course, you wouldn’t want us to violate
the decision of our Court, would you? The IMF backed down, and
the Hungarian Government was able to use the decisions of the Court
to renegotiate the bargain with the IMF.
On the question of legal families and international law in the antiterrorism campaign, the program of laws that countries must adopt is
universal and doesn’t depend on a country’s own legal history. But
one sees great differences both in the ways that laws are adapted to
fit the specifics of each country’s legal systems and also the ways
that laws are applied. For example, the Security Council framework
requires an extraordinary amount of change in banking regulation.
Financial transactions must be made more visible to states. And yet
in some countries, data privacy has been entrenched in ways that
require local adaptation of this mandate. As a result, most states are
adopting these laws as required by the Security Council, but they are
doing so in slightly different ways. The same is true in the area of
criminal law where again the Security Council Framework requires
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the criminalization not only of terrorism but also of inchoate crimes
like conspiracy. And of course, systems vary a lot in whether
inchoate crimes are permissible in the system of criminal law.
Sometimes states will adopt these new laws and then not enforce
them.
As a result, I think what we’re seeing is that international law
produces pressure toward the standardization of law, but that cultural
differences among legal systems emerge when these laws have to be
locally adopted, interpreted, and then applied.
PATRICK GLENN: Thank you. Thank you for all of those
comments and those from the panel as well. Some of the comments
suggest to me all of the obstacles that are before us. And all of these
obstacles are before us in a time of globalization essentially because
of the confrontational and conflictualist teaching of the last two or
three centuries.
We see that in private international law where the dominant
language is that of conflicts of law. In the 11th edition, I think of
Dicey and Morris on the Conflict of Laws, the authors state in their
discussion of the name of the subject that ‘laws may differ but they
do not conflict.’ Yet the authors conclude that the language of
conflict should be retained because of the ‘obvious inconvenience’ of
changing a name in use since the seventeenth century. In public
international law, as was just said by Professor Zoller, we have the
idea that the law is exclusively that of states. But once again you
think in terms of the conflictual relations between states and, of
course, the law of war is historically a dark part of the discipline of
public international law.
Those are all lawyer problems. The real problem I think that
societies face today is the result of teaching ‘what law is’ to the
public of our countries. We have taught for the last two or three
centuries that the basic form of human organization is what is called
a ‘nation state.’ And every nation state should be uniform. There
should be coincidence between the nation and the state. And publics
therefore react faced with irritants to that uniformity, which should
be the rule according to the teaching given for the last two or three
centuries. So we see riots. We see killings when there are
suggestions of deviation from what is taken to be a uniform norm of
law and governance.
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There has never been and there never will be a nation state.
But we have not taught that. We have not taught in reality how
successful states are successful. Diversity exists but it is within them,
as with the convivencia that the Spanish identified and were very
successful in implementing for a long period of centuries. So the
task, I think, of being comparative lawyers of the future is to attract
attention to the actual complexity of human relationships. And Ralf,
it’s not for us to dumb down the World Bank; it’s doing a good
enough job of that itself [audience laughter].
GEORGE BERMANN: Thank you. And of course, those were all
very stimulating and, in some cases, provocative comments. What I
sought to convey in my remarks is the challenge of performing
comparative law on a level of sophistication that’s appropriate for the
task to which it’s being harnessed. And I think that the message that I
think Elisabeth Zoller shares with me is not that we should deny the
utility of comparative law, that we should deny its utilitarian
dimension, but that we should labor with extreme effort to preserve
that which is not utilitarian about comparative law.
And that's why I don't quite understand some of the remarks made
earlier in the conversation to the effect that we on the panel are
questioning the utility of comparative law for the discharge of a
variety of functions. Comparative law is expected to deliver different
goods according to the function it is meant at any given time to
serve. Some functions may call for a high degree of sophistication,
while others demand law in more easily digestible form. Frankly it's
the variety of our missions that's presenting us with the biggest
challenge.
The final comment I want to make is not unrelated to Professor
Adrien Wing’s. I think it’s related. I think that every one of these
conferences should focus less on, or not focus exclusively on, the
utilitarian value of comparative law, and instead the focus should be
on the more cosmopolitan and more inclusive and more spacious
concept of the community in which we’re investing ourselves. I think
we are trying to move in that direction, but I would be the first to
agree with Adrien that conferences such as these have done a great
deal to make up ground in regard to the cosmopolitan composition.
The degree of cosmopolitanism within the constituency is relatively
high. I don't think we need to belabor the problems in conceiving of
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comparative law in terms of families of law. When we organize and
classify legal systems into families of law, we necessarily attach
ourselves to certain criteria, and those criteria drive the composition
and the structure of the families.
What we need to do is begin rethinking the suggestion that was
made. We need to rethink what the relative criterion is for classifying
those systems if we are inclined to classify. Some of us are not
inclined to classify. But I think that the fundamental question is—
what criterion is relevant? And it’s no longer whether Roman law
serves as one of the intellectual arches of the legal system that
divides one family from another. Thank you very much.
DAVID SNYDER: Thank you. When I put this panel together as I
told you in the introduction, my hope was that it would make me feel
better. Now let me just say that when I put together a list of the
problems—and Professor Glenn, yes, I did write that little polemic in
the program, as you guessed—I didn’t want to set all the categories
because I realized I might not be seeing everything myself. In doing
that, it had not occurred to me that you were going to give me all
kinds of other things to worry about, in addition to the ones that had
already occurred to me.
Nevertheless, after having heard all of the problems or challenges,
I think one thing we heard from the panel is about the promise of
comparative law. So much of it resonated for me, but I need to be
quick. So let me just say that something that makes me happy is to
think explicitly about comparative law as a humanistic discipline—a
particularly humanistic discipline, within the larger discipline of law,
which is itself humanistic, as well as many other things.
Regardless of the promise of comparative law, the panel has
convinced me of the necessity of comparative law. It is unavoidable.
And I think Professor Glenn teaches us that we ought to accept what
is unavoidable with a smile.

